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Urban Deforestation and Urban Development
Abstract
This paper has developed a model of a single forest owner operating with
perfect foresight in a dynamic open-city environment that allows for switching
between alternative competing land uses (forest and urban use) at some point in
the future. The model also incorporates external values of an even-aged stand-
ing forest in addition to the value of timber when it is harvested. Timber is
exploited based on a multiple rotation model a la Faustmann with clear-cut har-
vesting. In contrast to previous models, our alternative land use to forest land is
endogenous. Within this framework, we study the problem of the private owner
as well as that of the social planner, when choosing the time to harvest, the time
to convert land and the intensity of development. We also examine the extent to
which the two-way linkage between urban development and forest management
practices (timber production and provision of forest amenities) contributes to
economic efficiency and improvements in non-market forest benefits. Finally, we
consider policy options available to a regulator seeking to achieve improvements
in efficiency including anti-sprawl policies (impact fees and density controls) and
forest policies such a yield tax. Numerical simulations illustrate our analytical
results.
Keywords: Deforestation, Urban Development, Forest Management Prac-
tices, Anti-Sprawl Policies, Yield Taxes
1 Introduction
Urban forests can play a major role in climate regulation by reducing levels of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere (Nowak
and Crane (2002) [12]). Trees reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) through
carbon sequestration and reducing GHG emissions by conserving energy used
for space heating and cooling. Forests also provide a range of other ecological
goods and services such as biodiversity and watershed protection and amenity
benefits (recreation and scenic beauty).
Deforestation and suburban sprawl have substantially changed and frag-
mented our landscape. Almost 1 million acre of private forestland were lost
to development each year from 1992 to 1997, with many important timber-
producing states in the US –California, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and
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Washington– experiencing the greatest losses (Natural Resources Conservation
Service (2001)). Projections suggest that another 26 million acres will be lost to
development by 2030 (Alig and Plantinga (2004) [1]). Such disturbance of the
land can change the atmospheric concentration of CO2 as well as affect climate.
Conversion of land from forest to urban uses is now associated with a greater
average increase in minimum and maximum temperatures than rural land con-
versions (Halle et al. (2008) [5]). Environmental costs of suburban sprawl also
include air pollution from increases in traffic congestion and losses of open space
at the urban fringe (Kahn (2000) [8]).
When private forestland is developed, the market and nonmarket benefits
it provides can be reduced or lost altogether. Market values for forestland are
important to understanding financial issues affecting forestry, such as returns to
timber production and development. Nonmarket values are important because
they benefit society. Because nonmarket (social) benefits generally are not ac-
counted for in market prices for land, it is up to public and private institutions
to ensure that they are provided in sufficient quantity.
While the increasing economic importance of open space and forest amenities
(Leggett and Bockstael (2000) [10], Tyrvainen and Miettinen (2000) [?], Irwin
(2002) [7]) and the implications of nontimber benefits for harvesting within the
traditional Faustmann framework (Hartman (1976) [6], Strang (1983), Max and
Lehman (1988) [11], Englin and Klan (1990) [4]) are now well understood, the
feedback effects between urban development and forest land changes are not.
In general, theoretical models of forest management practices do not account
explicitly for the potential conversion of forest land to urban use over time. And,
models of urban development (Brueckner (1990) [2], Capozza and Helsley (1989)
[3], Turnbull (2002 [15], 2005 [16]) ) treat the alternative land use (agriculture
or forest) as exogenous and do not examine endogenous interactions between
forest management and development decisions.
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However, the development of a framework to more fully exploit the interplay
between urban development and deforestation may further reinforce the work-
ings of emission reduction programs if co-benefits from land-based mitigation
(e.g., carbon sequestration) are realized. The purpose of this paper is thus to
offer a first step towards such framework. We also ask the following questions:
What is the implication of forest land conversion over time for forest manage-
ment practices? How do forest management activities affect the pace of urban
development? Do anti-sprawl policies affect forest management practices and
deforestation? What is the impact of timber tax policies on the pace of urban
development?
Building on the framework of Capozza and Helsley (1989) [3] and Englin
and Klan (1990) [4], we develop a model of a single forest owner operating with
perfect foresight in a dynamic open-city environment that allows for switching
between competing land uses at some point in the future. The model incorpo-
rates external values of an even-aged standing forest in addition to the value of
timber when it is harvested. Timber is exploited based on a multiple rotation
model à la Faustmann with clear-cut harvesting. Forest conversion reduces the
service flow of the standing forest, but this opportunity cost is not reflected in
the landowner’s development decision. Land, housing and input markets are
competitive. Land conversion to urban use entails an exogenous cost.
With this setup, we study the problem of the private owner as well as that
of the social planner, when choosing the time to harvest, the time to convert
land and the intensity of development. We also examine the extent to which the
two-way linkage between urban development and forest management practices
(timber production and provision of forest amenities) contributes to economic
efficiency and improvements in non-market forest benefits. Finally, we consider
policy options available to a regulator seeking to achieve improvements in ef-
ficiency including anti-sprawl policies (impact fees and density controls) and
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forest policies such a yield tax. Numerical simulations illustrate our analyti-
cal results and examine further the optimal rotation length, the optimal time to
switch between land uses and the maximized returns to land use with switching.
Our analysis reveals several interesting findings. Private development can be
more rapid than the development that a social planner would carry out. Higher
opportunity rents along the equilibrium growth path slow development of the
forested land. The source of the slope of our marginal benefit of waiting to de-
velop is nevertheless forest management practices and not demanded density, as
our development costs do not depend on structural density. For higher utility or
transportation costs along the equilibrium growth path, development pace also
slows down. For higher income along the equilibrium trajectory, development
pace accelerates. Because nontimber amenities are not taken into account, the
forest owner fails to account for the environmental costs of development, which
include current nontimber benefits and future nontimber benefits from forest
land due to irreversibility of development. As a result, forest land conversion
may occur sooner than what is socially optimal. The forest landowner also does
not take into account nontimber benefits when making harvesting decisions,
which leads to inefficient rotation cycles.
We also find that the interdependence of irreversible urban development
and forest amenities generates an option value that arises even in the absence
of uncertainty. The size of this option value depends on the balance between
the stream of forest externalities up to the harvest time (for each rotation) and
current externalities. The sign of the option value depends on the shape of the
externalities function. The interplay between the rotation and conversion dates
also depends on the shape of the forest externality function. If urban trees
provide less externalities as they grow older, the earlier the land is converted,
the greater the incentive to reduce the rotation date in order to anticipate
revenues from timber and to increase the benefits from non-timber externalities.
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In contrast, if externalities grow with the age of the tree, the impact on the
optimal rotation date depends on what effect dominates, timber or non-timber
benefits. To increase benefits from timber exploitation, trees should be cut
earlier, while to increase the production of non-timber externalities, it is optimal
to postpone harvest. If it is the case where non-timber externalities are very
strong, then the urban area can grow inwards.
Finally, we show that the optimal pace of land development can be imple-
mented as a private solution through impact fees that internalize the present
value of forest amenities and irreversibility costs of development. Development
fees represent an additional cost of development and will in general slow the
development pace. Efficiency can also be improved with a density restriction.
Density restrictions affect urban development by reducing the value of land in
urban use. These land use policies also affect rotation date decisions given the
interdependency between conversion and rotation dates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the assumptions of an
economic model that represents clear-cutting decisions for a single even-aged
stand in the presence of an endoegnous alternative land use. In Section 3, we
solve the problem of the social planner and present the socially optimal rotation
date and conversion date. Section 4 examines the unregulated equilibrium, that
is, the problem of the private forest landowner. In Section 5, discusses the policy
implications, and, finally, Section 6 offers conclusions. Technical derivations and
Figures are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Analytical Model
This section presents the assumptions of the analytical model. Building on
the framework of Capozza and Helsley (1989) [3] and Englin and Klan (1990)
[4], this section develops a model of a single, price-taking forest owner operat-
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ing with perfect foresight in a dynamic open-city environment that allows for
switching between competing land uses at some point in the future. The model
also incorporates multiple rotations and external values of a standing forest in
addition to the value of timber when it is harvested. Urban development once
undertaken is assumed to be irreversible.
2.1 Assumptions
Assume that a private forest landowner has one even-aged forest stand located
x miles from a central business district (CBD), an that this is the current best
use of his land. The forest provides a flow of valuable services while standing in
addition to the value of timber when it is harvested. Timber is exploited based
on a multiple rotation model à la Faustmann. There are two land use options
for this land: maintain it as forest or convert it to urban use. Forest conversion
reduces the service flow of the standing forest, but this opportunity cost is not
reflected in the landowner’s development decision. In addition, the forest owner
also does not take into account non-timber benefits in timber rotation decisions.
Land, housing and input markets are competitive markets.
2.1.1 Forest Land Rent
We define joint production of benefits from the forest as the sum of timber and
non-timber benefits. If trees are planted at t = 0 and harvested at t = T ,
then t represents the age of the forest and T is both the length of the rotation
cycle [0, T ] and the harvesting age or rotation date. At harvesting moments,
the forest owner immediately plants the next age class. The sequence of jump
points, jT , with j = 1, 2, ...,K , K ≤ ∞, determines the stand rotation or
harvesting periods. All rotation cycles, have the same length T .
Timber Benefits
Timber prices, p, and harvesting and replanting costs, c are assumed to be
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constant over time. Following the Faustmann-Hartman framework, replanting
activities follow immediately after harvest. Let v(T ) represent the volume of
commercially valuable timber biomass on a forest stand over the rotation age
jT , which is assumed to be a strictly concave function. The present value at
time 0 of the financial reward from harvesting the stand at jT is given by:
[pv(T )− c]e−rjT , j = 1, 2, ...,K (1)
where r is the discount rate and pv(T )−c is the value of timber net of harvesting
and replanting costs, which is constant over rotation cycles.
Non-Timber Benefits
As the harvest is clear-cut, non-timber services are a function of the age of
the trees. Let F (t) denote the value of the amenity and environmental services
flowing from the standing forest of age t. A value of dF (t)
dt
> 0 is generally
assumed, indicating that a well established forest provides more non-timber
benefits than a young forest. However, this assumption has been challenged
by Englin and Klan (1990) [4] and Swallow et al. (1990) [14] who argue that
non-timber benefits may follow any time path, depending on the externalities
considered. In the analysis that follows, the only restriction placed on F (t) is
differentiability. The present value of amenity services from the forest stand
under a single harvest cycle of length T is given by:
∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt (2)
Multiple-Rotation Forest
In the case of several harvests, the present value of a multiple-rotation forest
is given by the sum of the net present value of harvest revenue and the present
value of amenity services over all rotations:


K∑
j=1
e−rjT

 (pv(T )− c) +


K∑
j=1
e−r(j−1)T


∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt (3)
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2.1.2 Urban Land Rent
When the forest is harvested, the landowner decides whether to keep the land
in forest use or convert it to urban use. Once the stand has been converted to
urban use it will be maintained under this use forever. Conversion to urban use
entails a cost of D per unit of land. TD represents the conversion date, which
satisfies (j−1)T < TD < jT , with j = 2, ...,K , K ≤∞. The latter assumption
implies that conversion of land into urban use can occur within a rotation cycle
or at the rotation date. For example, if j = 2, timber is harvested at the end of
the first rotation period, t = T , and is harvested again at t = TD, T < TD < 2T ,
when land is converted into urban use. Note that when j = 1, conversion occurs
at TD and not even one rotation cycle is completed. If the rotation date and
the conversion date coincide then, t = T = TD. A similar reasoning can be used
to any other value of j.
Housing Rent Function
A representative urban resident enjoys utility from housing (q) and a compos-
ite consumption good (g). Households preferences are represented by a strictly
quasi-concave utility function U(g, q). For simplicity we set the price of the
composite good equal to1 and housing demand is also fixed at one unit. The
household budget constraint is given by g + b = y(t) − z(t)x, where x denotes
distance to the CBD, z(t) commuting costs per mile at time t, b is the rental
price of housing and y(t) denotes income earned at time t.
Housing bid rent is determined via the open-city assumption, under which
the time path of utility is given by an exogenous function U(t). Substituting for
g using the budget constraint, the representative urban resident achieves utility
U(t) when b satisfies the equation:
U(y(t)− b− z(t)x, 1) = U(t) (4)
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Equation (4) implies that in equilibrium, utility must be identical regardless
where a urban resident lives, otherwise, some urban residents will have an incen-
tive to move. Equation (4) also implicitly defines the housing bid rent function
as:
b(t, x) = b(y(t)− z(t)x, 1, U(t)) (5)
Equation (5) describes the maximum rent per unit floor area that a house-
hold is willing to pay at distance x from the CBD if it is to receive a given level
of utility U(t).
A key assumption is that y, k and U(t) vary over time in a way that en-
sures that bt > 0, so that housing bid rents rise over time. This requires that
disposable income y(t)− z(t)x is increasing sufficiently rapidly (or falling suffi-
ciently slowly) relative to utility.1 Moreover the housing bid rent is a decreasing
function of distance from the CBD, bx = −z(t) < 0.
Urban Land Rent Function
Houses are immutable and do not depreciate once constructed. Housing floor
space is produced with capital and land according to a strictly concave, constant
returns to scale production function. The intensive form of the production
function is written h(S), where S is capital per unit of land, referred to as
structural density, and h satisfies h > 0 and h < 0. Conversion to urban
use entails a cost of D per unit of land, which we assume to be constant over
time.2 At each point in time, t, the landowner chooses the amount of structural
density S to maximize the gross profit per unit of land at location x, while
taking into account (4):
b(y(t)− z(t)x, 1, U(t))h(S) (6)
1Differentiating (4) with respect to t and rearranging yields bt = [yt − ztx]−
Ut
Ug
.
2Conversion costs could be modelled as a convex function, D(S), with D/ > 0 and D// ≥ 0.
The assumption D// = 0 here reduces notation clutter and changes none of the results.
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S is chosen to maximize (6), satisfying the first-order condition:
b(y(t)− z(t)x, 1, U(t))hS = 0 (7)
The density condition (7) requires that more density should be added up
to the point where the value of incremental gross profit from greater density
equals zero. The solution to (7) gives structural density as a function of t and
x, S(t, x) = S(y(t)− z(t)x, 1, U(t)).
Finally, urban land rent, denoted R(t, x), is equal to profit per unit of land:
R(t, x) = b(y(t)− z(t)x, 1, U(t))h(S(t, x)) (8)
By the envelope theorem, the derivatives of the urban land rent function
R(t, x) are given by:
dR
dt
= bth > 0 (9)
dR
dx
= bxh < 0
Differentiating (7), yields the derivatives of structural density with respect
to time (t) and distance (x) as:
dS
dt
= −bthS/bhSS > 0 (10)
dS
dx
= −bxhS/bhSS < 0
Thus, urban land rent (R(t, x)) and structural density (S(t, x)) are decreas-
ing with distance from the CBD and rising over time.
If the landowner has perfect foresight, the value at time 0 of converted land
at location x equals the present value of anticipated urban land rents net the
present value of conversion costs:
∫
∞
TD
R(t, x)e−rtdt−De−rTD (11)
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3 Optimal Conversion Date and Rotation Date
We first examine the problem of a social planner. Subsection 3.1 sets up the
maximization problem for the social planner and subsection 3.2 derives the first-
order conditions for the socially optimal choice of T > 0 and TD > 0, given a K.
3 Subsection 3.3 examines how endogenous forest management decisions and
pace of urban development influence each other. We also discuss how market and
policy failures, such as environmental externalities, may create a bias towards
excessive deforestation and excessive urban development and dicuss the policy
implications. All mathematical derivations are provided in the Appendix.
3.1 The Social Planner Problem
The goal of a social planner is to choose the rotation date (T ) and conversion
date (TD) to maximize the present value of land at location x, assuming that
forest is the current best use for that plot. As before, the problem is solved in
two steps. First, conditional on the number of rotation cycles (K), and for each
K, V (T, TD | K) is maximized. Then, the optimal solution will be associated
to the value of K for which V (.) is maximum.
The present value of land is given by the sum of land rent while in forest use
which includes the value of non-timber benefits from the standing forest and the
timber value for the stand over multiple rotations and the land rent once land is
converted to urban use less the cost of converting the parcel (see the Appendix
for details):
3The second-order conditions for a pair (T, TD) > 0 to be a local maximum are given by:
VTT < 0, VTDTD < 0 and VTT VTDTD −
[
VTTD
]2
> 0. All mathematical derivations are
presented in the Appendix.
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V (T, TD | K) = e
−rTD(pv(TD −KT )− c) + e
−rT (pv(T )− c)
1− e−rKT
1− e−rT︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+(12)
+e−rKT
∫ TD−KT
0
F (t)e−rtdt+
1− e−rKT
1− e−rT
∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
+
+
∫
∞
TD
R(t, x)e−rtdt−De−rTD
︸ ︷︷ ︸
III
Term I in (12) is the present value at time 0 of the net revenues from
timber exploitation at the end of each rotation. Term II is the present value
of non-timber benefits from a standing forest up to the date of conversion.
Term III is the present value at time 0 of future urban rents from the date of
conversion onward net the present value of conversion costs at time TD. Note
that nontimber values, F (t), and timber stock, v(t), are both a function of the
age of the trees. The age of the trees is identified as the calendar time minus
the time at planting, that is, t = T̃ − jT , where T̃ ∈ [jT, ..., TD, ..., (j + 1)T ],
where j = 1, ...,K. Once T and TD are chosen, the social planner chooses the
K for which V (T, TD,K) is maximum.4
3.2 The Social Optimum
Socially Optimal Conversion Date
Differentiating (12) with respect to TD and rearranging yields the first order
4Note that in the above problem it is required that KT ≤ TD < (K + 1)T. Since the
maximization problem is performed for each K,TD can only be within the range defined by
the interval above. We may then rewrite that inequality as follows: TD = (K + µ)T , where
0 ≤ µ < 1. Thus, the problem can be separated in two problems, that is, for µ = 0, and for
0 < µ < 1. In the first case, the problem is only a function of one variable, T , for each K.
The second problem can be stated as a Lagrangean maximization problem with respect to
µ, T , and λ, the shadow price associated with the constraint µ < 1. Ultimately, the problem
as presented in the text can be shown to be equivalent to these two problems, as long as the
solution is interior, that is, KT < TD < (K + 1)T . See the Appendix for details.
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condition for the socially optimal conversion date as:
R(TD, x) = rD + F (TD −KT ) + pvt(TD −KT )− r [pv(TD −KT )− c] (13)
Condition (13) requires that the forest owner wait until the annualized cost of
development, which is the opportunity cost of the capital invested in converting
the land, rD, plus the opportunity cost of forest land equals land rent from
developing the land, R(TD, x). The opportunity cost of forest land consists of
the environmental value during the period (F (TD −KT )) plus the value of the
timber growth over the period (pvt(TD − KT )) net the capital returns form
investing the returns from harvested timber at time TD, (r [pv(TD −KT )− c]).
5
Land is converted to urban use only when the urban land rent (left-hand
side of (13) is no less than the opportunity cost of development (right-hand side
of (13)). If TD → ∞, then land is kept in forest use forever, as well as if it is
optimal never to harvest T →∞. 6
Socially Optimal Rotation Date
Differentiating (12) with respect to T and rearranging yields the first order
condition for the socially optimal rotation period as:7
5The value of some non-timber benefits (e.g. recreational benefits) and other values such as
watershed production, carbon storage and nonuse benefits such as option and existence values
may depend on distance to the CBD, so that we would have F (t, x). However, to simplify the
discussion, in the following we assume that non-timber benefits do not depend on distance to
the CBD and analyze only the case of F (t).
6Note that TD → ∞ implies that R(TD, x) − rD < pvt(TD − KT ) + F (TD − KT ) −
r [pv(TD −KT )− c].
7See Appendix.
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pvt((K + 1)T −KT ) =
r
1− e−rT
[pv((K + 1)T −KT )− c] +
[
r
1− e−rT
∫ (K+1)T−KT
0
F (t)e−rtdt− F (
+
rK
1− e−rKT
[
pvt(TD −KT )(1− e
−rT )er(K+1)T e−rTD
r
− (pv((K + 1)T −KT )
+
rK
1− e−rKT
[
F (TD −KT )(1− e
−rT )er(K+1)T
r
−
∫ TD−KT
0
F (t)e−rtdt
]
e−rKT
+
rK
1− e−rKT
[∫ TD−KT
0
F (t)e−rtdt−
∫ (K+1)T−KT
0
F (t)e−rtdt
]
e−r(K−1)T
Expression (14) can be interpreted as an optimal harvesting condition for the
present model which includes multiple rotation cycles, non-timber externalities,
an endogenous alternative land use and forest land conversion to urban use
at some point in the future. Interpretation of this formula follows conventional
lines, weighting the marginal gain from postponing the harvest one cycle against
the marginal loss of postponement. However, because in our model it is possible
to harvest the stand within a rotation cycle if land is converted to urban use,
our optimal harvesting condition can be interpreted as a Faustmann-Hartman
like equation that includes new elements, associated with the disturbance of the
switch to urban use at time TD.
The left-hand side of (14) is the marginal benefit of delaying the harvest. It
consists of the increase in the value of timber if the clear-cutting of the stand is
delayed one period.
The right-hand side of (14) is the opportunity cost of delaying the har-
vest and consists of five terms.The first two terms represent the costs of hold-
ing the trees. The first term is the income that could be earned if revenue
from cutting the stand were invested at an interest rate r. It accounts for
the interest rate on the numerator and for the multiple rotation aspect of
any version of the Faustman formula on the denominator. The second term
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represents the “externality balance” found in the conventional Haustmann-
Hartman framework (Hartman (1976) [6], Englin and Klan [4], Koskela and
Ollikainen (2001) [9]), which compares the value of current non-timber benefits
(F ((K + 1)T − KT )) versus a discounted value representing the future non-
timber benefits associated with the growth of the next generation of trees after
felling ( r1−e−rT
∫ (K+1)T−KT
0 F (t)e
−rtdt). The sign of this externality balance
depends on the shape of the non-timber benefits function.
Finally, the third, forth and fifth terms on the right-hand side of (14) rep-
resent the opportunity cost of postponing future forest timber (third term) and
non-timber (forth and fifth terms) benefits, if conversion to urban use is delayed
by one instant. That is, the last tree terms represent the costs of holding the
land in forest use. These additional terms state that the possibility of converting
forest land to urban use at time TD < (K+1)T affects the decision on when to
harvest the timber, that is, the optimal rotation date. These terms also state
that the appropriate correction to the Faustmann-Hartmann equation when the
forest owner switches to an alternative land use at some point in the future
TD is the present value of the net balance of timber and non-timber benefits
associated with a standing forest for the planning horizon running from KT to
TD < (K + 1)T .
At the optimal rotation age, the extra earnings from waiting one more period
must equal the cost of holding the trees and the land in forest use.8
3.3 Pace of Urban Development
In this subsection we examine the pace of urban development with the aid of
(13). Condition (13) implicitly defines the boundary between forest and urban
use at time TD, x(TD, T ). Thus, at x(TD, T ), the annualized forest land value
8Forest Preservation (T →∞, TD →∞, ∂V (T, TD)/∂T > 0 and ∂V (T, TD)/∂TD < 0)
If it is the case that non-timber benefits are sufficiently great and/or the value of the
alternative use (R(TD , x)) is very small (with TD → ∞) such that the following condition is
satisfied9
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equals the urban use opportunity cost:
F (TD −KT ) + pvt(TD −KT )− r [pv(TD −KT )− c] = R(TD, x)− rD (24)
Socially Optimal Pace of Urban Development
To examine how the boundary of the urban area changes over time, we
differentiate (24) with respect to TD to obtain:
dx
dTD
=
−Rt + {Ft(TD −KT ) + p [vtt(TD −KT )− rvt(TD −KT )]}
[
1−K dT
dTD
]
Rx
>=< 0
(25)
[R(TD , x)− rD] (1− e
−rT )er(K+1)T
r
+ (18)
+[pv(TD −KT )− c] (1− e
−rT )er(K+1)T − (19)
− (pv(T )− c)− (20)
−
pvt(TD −KT )(1− e
−rTD )(1− e−rT )er(K+1)T
r
− (21)
−
[
(1− erT )
∫ TD−KT
0
F (t)e−rtdt+
∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt
]
(22)
< 0 (23)
then the value of the forest increases the farther the harvest date is pushed into the future, and
it is quite possible that it is optimal never to harvest.From (13) we get that F (TD −KT ) =
R(TD, x)− rD− pvt(TD −KT ) + r [pv(TD −KT )− c]. Inserting this equation into the forth
term of (14) and noting that T = (K + 1)T −KT while manipulating the last three terms of
equation (14) yields (??).
If
∂V (.)
∂T
> 0 then the optimal rotation age approaches infinity and preserving the existing
forest for nontimber forest benefits provides the greatest land value. The reason is because the
returns to natural forest management would be greater than the returns to plantation timber
production and/or urban use. Of course, this assumes that mature trees would provide the
greatest non-timber benefits and thus no effort is needed for replanting the stand for nontimber
benefits only. In this case, it follows that:
V (0 < T <∞, 0 < TD <∞) < V (T →∞, TD →∞)
Joint Management of Forest with no Switching (0 < T <∞, TD →∞, ∂V (T, TD)/∂T = 0
and ∂V (T, TD)/∂TD > 0)
In this case, there is an optimal T that ensures that the marginal benefits from managing
the land for timber and nontimber benefits equals the marginal costs of holding the timber
and land for sucessive rotations. The land would thus be kept in perpetuity in forest use like
in the conventional Faustmann-Hartman model:
V (0 < T <∞, 0 < TD <∞) < V (0 < T <∞, TD →∞)
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with Rt =
[
yt − ztx−
Ut
Ug
]
h > 0. Moreover, whether the urban area
expands onwards or inwards (towards the CBD) over time also depends on the
interplay between rotation date and convertion date ( dT
dTD
) (see the Appendix
for further details):
dT
dTD
=
−VTTD
VTT
=
−rKpvt(TD −KT ) +Kpvtt(TD −KT ) +KFt(TD −KT )
VTT
>=< 0
(26)
By (strict) concavity of V (.), the denominator of (26), VTT , is negative.
By strict concavity of v(t), the first two terms of the numerator, VTTD , are
negative, while the sign of the third term depends on how nontimber benefits are
related to the age of the trees. If the production of externalities is independent
from the age of the trees, Ft(.) = 0, the optimal rotation period is the same
as Faustmann’s. In this case, only the present value of the land per hectare
increases in the presence of externalities, without affecting the optimal rotation
period, and dT
dTD
> 0.
If externalities grow with the age of the tree (Ft(.) > 0), the impact on the
optimal rotation date depends on what effect dominates, timber or non-timber
benefits from a standing forest. To increase benefits from timber exploitation
trees should be cut earlier, while to increase the production of non-timber ex-
ternalities, it is optimal to postpone harvest. If it is the case that non-timber
externalities are very strong, dominating the timber components, then dT
dTD
can
be negative.
If trees provide less externalities as they grow older, that is, Ft(.) < 0,
dT
dTD
is positive. Therefore, the earlier the land is converted, the greater the incentive
to reduce the rotation date in order to anticipate revenues from timber and to
increase the benefits from non-timber externalities. As a result, the provision
of externalities reinforce the effect from timber.
In order to interpret these results, we need to impose more structure on F.
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Assuming that F is concave, then a high value for Ft corresponds to younger
trees, that is, a low t, while a low value corresponds to older trees, that is, a
large t. Moreover, the sign of dT
dTD
is evaluated at t = TD−KT, as it is clear from
(26). In other words, what matters is what occurs in the interval between the
time period at which the last rotation cycle ends and the time of conversion TD.
So, if Ft(.) > 0 and strong enough to dominate the timber terms, by concavity
of F (.) trees are young, so when TD increases it is optimal to decrease T in order
to enlarge that interval as much as possible to have older trees when they are cut
for the last time, that is, when the land is irreversibly converted into urban land,
TD. This explains why
dT
dTD
< 0 in this case. In contrast, if Ft(.) > 0 but not
strong enough to dominate the timber terms, then trees are older. Therefore,
if TD increases, in order to shorten the interval, T has to increase. Therefore,
trees will be younger when they are cut for the last time, before the plot is
irreversibly converted to urban use, at TD, thus, maximizing the benefits from
timber exploitation. In fact, in this case, the benefits from timber exploitation
dominate those from non-timber externalities.
In alternative, we could assume that F is convex. In that case, a low Ft(.) > 0
is associated with younger trees, while a large Ft(.) > 0 is associated to older
trees. We could argue similarly, as the results do not change.10 Finally, trees
may provide less externalities as they grow older, that is, Ft(.) < 0. In this case,
dT
dTD
is always positive. Independently of the age of the trees, as TD increases,
it is optimal to shorten the interval before cutting for the last time implying
that trees will be younger. Recall that benefits from non-timber exploitation
reinforce benefits from timber exploitation.
There are several insights from examining equation (25). First, given that
Rx < 0 , equation (25) states that, ceteris paribus, rising non-timber benefits
10Likewise, if trees are old, then it optimal to enlarge the interval by decreasing T in order
to take advantage of older trees. If trees are young, then it is optimal to shorten the interval
by increasing T , in order to have younger trees.
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level (Ft) will slow down the pace of land development, while rising urban resi-
dents’ disposable income (yt − ztx) will increase the pace of land development.
Second, if it is the case where p [rvt(TD −KT )− vtt(TD −KT )] = Ft , the
urban area expands onwards (from the CBD) over time due to the increase over
time in urban land rents (Rt), as in Brueckner (1990) [2]. In fact, in this case,
dT
dTD
= 0, and dx
dTD
= −Rt
Rx
> 0. Note also that when non-timber externalities are
very strong, dominating the timber terms, dT
dTD
will be negative and the urban
area may grow inwards.
Thus, a key insight from our model is that changes over time in the oppor-
tunity cost of urban land affect development patterns and leapfrog development
may occur at sites where the environmental and amenity services of forests are
rising over time or when the marginal benefits from managing the land for tim-
ber and non-timber benefits outweights the marginal benefits from converting
that plot of land to urban use.
Structural Density and Pace of Urban Development
Further insight into the optimal pace of urban development can be gained
by examining (24) in the context of related models. Condition (24) shows that
the optimal conversion or developing time is where the marginal benefit of de-
veloping at t equals the marginal cost. Differentiating (24) with respect to time
(t) yields:
−prvt(TD −KT ) + pvtt(TD −KT ) + Ft(TD −KT ) = Rt(TD, x) (27)
The left-hand side of (27) represents the slope of the marginal benefit of
waiting to develop, evaluated at t = TD −KT, while the right-hand side repre-
sents the slope of the marginal cost of waiting to convert land into urban use,
which can also be written as follows:
19
Rt(TD, x) =
dS
dTD
bhSSh
hS
+
(VTDT )
2
VTT
(28)
Thus, from (28) and (26) the impact of a marginal change in the optimal con-
version date on the structural density, dS
dTD
, is given by:
dS
dTD
= −
hS(Rt +Rx
dx
dTD
)
bhSSh
=
hS
[
−
(VTDT )
2
VTT
− p{rvt(TD −KT )− vtt(TD −KT )}+ Ft(TD −KT )
]
bhSSh
(29a)
with hSS < 0, b, h,and Rt > 0. Because the sign of
dx
dTD
is ambiguous a priori,
we cannot determine the impact of conversion date on structural density. Note
from (29a) that the sign of dS
dTD
depends on how nontimber benefits are related
to the age of the trees (Ft(.)) .
In contrast to the case where the opportunity cost of developed land (for
example agricultural rent or forestry rent) is exogenous, the slope of our mar-
ginal benefit of waiting is not given by the slope of demanded density. When
the opportunity cost of developed land is exogenous and constant over time, as
in Turnbull (2005), the marginal benefit of waiting to develop a plot of land is
upward (downward) sloped when the demanded density is rising (falling) over
time. This occurs when the current best use has a lower (higher) structural
density than a future best use. As the development time is postponed, the best
use for that time entails greater (lower) structural density and hence the curve
depicting development time and the best use at that time is upward (downward)
sloped.
In our framework, the marginal benefit of waiting can also be upward or
downward sloping. Note that the sign of the slope of the marginal benefit is
given by the numerator of dT
dTD
. Therefore, dT
dTD
> 0 implies that the slope of the
marginal benefit is negative, and vice-versa if dT
dTD
< 0. However, the underlying
source of the slope of our marginal benefit of waiting is not demanded density
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but the return of land in its current use (forest) over time, as development costs
are constant. As a result, our marginal benefit of waiting is only influenced
by forest management practices (timber exploitation and nontimber amenities
provision). Depending on the sign of this new term and on the magnitudes of
the different components of the marginal benefit of waiting, we may have cases
where the marginal benefit of waiting to develop is downward sloped when the
demanded density is rising over time.11 This obviously will have impact on the
way regulations affect the use of land.
On the other hand, the forgone urban land rents represent the marginal cost
of waiting. Since the demand for urban land is growing over time, this (annual-
ized) return is rising over time and the marginal cost of delaying conversion is
upward sloped in general. Any change over time in U(t), z(t) and y(t) changes
housing bid rents and thus, urban land rents and the marginal cost of waiting.
The most profitable time to develop is thus when the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of waiting are equal. Higher opportunity rents along the equilib-
rium growth path (F (TD−KT )+ pvt(TD−KT )− r [pv(TD −KT )− c]) would
slow development of the forested land so that the urban area is smaller at each
point in time. For higher utility or transportation costs along the equilibrium
growth path development pace also slows down ( ∂TD
∂U(t)
> 0, ∂TD
∂z(t) > 0). For
higher income along the equilibrium trajectory, development pace acelerates
( ∂TD
∂y(t) < 0).
11Suppose that the cost of developing the land (D(S)) rises with greater structural density.
In this case, our development timing condition is given by: rD(S)+F (TD −KT )+ pvt(TD −
KT ) − r [pv(TD −KT )− c] = R(TD, x), where the left-hand side is the marginal benefit of
waiting. Differentiating the marginal benefit yields: rDsSt(TD) + pvtt(TD −KT ) + Ft(TD −
KT ) − prvt(TD − KT ), which in the case of Turnbull (2005) ?? takes the sign of St since
the opportunity cost of developed land is exogenous and constant over time. However, in our
framework the opportunity cost of land is endogenous, and changes over time according to
(pvtt(TD −KT ) + Ft(TD −KT )− prvt(TD −KT )). Thus, the marginal benefit of delaying
development depends not only on demanded density but also on the return of the opportunity
cost of developed land.
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4 The Unregulated Equilibrium
The unregulated equilibrium is examined next. In contrast to the social planner,
the private forest landowner chooses the rotation date T and conversion date
TD to maximize the present value of land at location x, (12) , conditional on
the number of rotation cycles (K), without taking into account the non-timber
benefits of a standing forest (Term II equals zero ).
Private Optimal Conversion Date
The first-order condition for the private optimal time of development, TD >
0, given a K, is:
R(TD, x) = rD+ pvt(TD −KT )− r [pv(TD −KT )− c] (30)
A comparison of (30) with (13) shows that the private forest landowner does
not take into account the environmental and amenity services from a standing
forest when making his development decision (F (TD−KT ) = 0). For a given K
and T , land is thus developed earlier than when it is socially optimal. Moreover,
(30) also reveals that the pattern of land development under free market is
inefficient because the boundary of the developed zone under the free market is
suboptimal. As a result, the private forest landowner not only develops more
than is optimal from a social perspective but is also more responsive to changes
in economic conditions such as urban residents’s disposable income.
Private Optimal Rotation Date
The first-order condition for the private optimal rotation time, T > 0, given
a K, is:
pvt((K + 1)T −KT ) =
r
1− e−rT
[pv((K + 1)T −KT )− c] +
+
rK
1− e−rKT
[
pvt(TD −KT )(1− e
−rT )er(K+1)T e−rTD
r
− (pv((K + 1)T −KT )
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A comparison of (31) with (14) shows that the forest owner’s failure to
account for all standing values also leads to a divergence between public and
private rotation periods. For a given TD and K, depending on the nature of
the externalities (sign of Ft), the private rotation length can be lower or higher
than the socially optimal one.
Moreover, the optimal adjustment of the harvesting time to a marginal
change in the development time, evaluated at t = TD − KT , which is given
by:
dT
dTD
=
−VTTD
VTT
=
−rKpvt(TD −KT ) +Kpvtt(TD −KT )
VTT
> 0 (33)
is always positive because of convexity of v(.) and V (.). This implies that the ro-
tation and development decisions reinforce each other in the unregulated market.
Thus, anything which decreases (increases) the development timing will shorten
(lengthen) the optimal rotation. Recall that if TD increases, in order to shorten
the interval, T has to increase. Therefore, when trees are harvested at con-
version time they are younger. This is in contrast to the social planner’s case,
in which the corresponding impact was ambiguous, depending on the balance
between timber and the provision of environmental amenities.
Absent government policy, the private choices of T and TD are thus ineffi-
cient because no market exists for services provided by the standing forest. A
key policy insight from our results is that if we expect the benefits from urban
forests to continue to be highly valued in the future, then government interven-
tion may be required to create appropriate incentives for private landowners to
preserve forest land today, even if alternative land use options, such as urban
use, currently offer higher private present value returns.12 In particular, the so-
12Alig and Plantinga (2004) [1] estimate the average present value of future returns of land
in timber production for 473 counties in the southeastern United States at $415 per acre,
compared to its value in residential housing at $36,216–land with a developed value nearly
90 times higher than its forest value. Developed values in the Pacific Northwest Westside are
estimated at 111 times higher than forest values. This financial land-use hierarchy means that
private forestry returns alone are unlikely to keep some land in forest when development is an
option.
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cial optimum involves two objectives, that is, to adjust both the conversion time
and the rotation period. To achieve those targets, and implement the efficient
solution, policy intervention is required.
Private Optimal Structural Density
Differentiating (30) with respect to time, t,yields:
Rt(TD, x) = −rpvt(TD −KT ) + pvtt(TD −KT ) (34)
The left-hand side of (34) is the slope of the marginal cost of waiting, which
is positively sloped.
The right-hand side of (34) is the slope of the marginal benefit of waiting,
which is always negatively sloped. Remember that the slope of the marginal
social benefit of waiting can be either positive or negative depending on whether
dT
dTD
> 0 or dT
dTD
< 0. The intuition underlying these results was explained in
Section 3.
When dT
dTD
> 0, two cases may occur. Either Ft > 0 but it does not dominate
the negative timber terms, or Ft < 0, reinforcing them. When comparing the
slope of the marginal social benefit of waiting to that of the private one in
absolute terms, we conclude that while in the former case the social one is
lower, in the latter case it is higher, exchanging the relative positions (see Figs.
1a) and 2a)). Therefore, while in the former case the social planner solution is
characterized by a larger TD, and hence a larger T , in the latter case it is the
opposite.
When dT
dTD
< 0, implying that Ft > 0 and strong enough to dominate the
negative timber terms, the slope of the social marginal benefit is positive, while
that for the private forest landowner is always negative. As a result, if forest
amenities are strong enough, it is optimal from a social perspective to increase
the optimal rotation which is traded-off against an earlier development time.
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Given the marginal cost of waiting, depending on the relative positions of the
marginal benefit curves, different outcomes may emerge. (see Figs. 3a), 4a)).
On the other hand, using (9) and (10), we obtain:
dS
dt
=
−RthS
hhSSb
> 0
implying that the demanded density is rising over time. Therefore, the optimal
structural density at TD can be obtained from S(TD). From Section 3, we have
that S(TD, x(TD)) = S(TD) = S(y(TD)− z(TD)x(TD), 1, U(TD)).
Finally, the marginal benefit of waiting to develop is negatively sloped while
the structural density is positively sloped. This was never the case in Turnbull
where the opportunity cost of the current land use is exogenous.
5 Policy Implications
Both governments and private conservation organizations intervene to correct
“market failures” associated with loss of forestland as open space. Public poli-
cies and programs arise from the political process when enough voters become
sufficiently concerned about open space lost to development (Wolfram (1981)
[18]). This section explores the issue of how to design appropriate incentive
schemes to induce the private forest landowner to make socially optimal deci-
sions. We start by first exploring two kinds of price-based policies: a one time
impact fee assessed at the time of development and a yield or unit tax on har-
vesting. We then examine how land-use regulations can also affect forest land
preservation and forest management practices. Although land-use regulations
usually are not enacted solely to protect open space, they all have open space
implications and often garner widespread support among voters in rapidly grow-
ing places. Thus, we also examine a quantity-based instrument in the form of a
zoning regulation that establishes a cap on the floor-area-ratio (FAR) density.
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Each policy option is specified below.
Impact Fees
The land use planner can use a one time impact fee to affect both the pace
of urban development and the forest rotation length. This fee or tax represents
an additional cost of development to the private forest landowner and will in
general slow the development pace. Because there is an interaction between the
conversion date and the rotation date, an impact fee has also an indirect impact
on the forest rotation length.
Let θ be the impact fee levied as a lump-sum tax. The first-order condition
for the private forest landowner with respect to the conversion date TD is now
given by:
R(TD, x) = r(D + θ) + pvt(TD −KT )− r [pv(TD −KT )− c] (35)
Note that the first-order condition with respect to T is the same as before.
A comparison of (30) with (35) shows that the private development timing
condition is now modified only by the addition of the annualized development
fee, rθ, to the right hand side. This development fee increases the marginal
benefit of waiting, thereby slowing the development pace.
By differentiating the system of first-order conditions with respect to T , TD,
and θ, and applying Cramer’s rule, we get the impact that a marginal change
in the impact fee level has on the conversion and rotation dates:
dT
dθ
=
rVTTD
D
> 0 (36)
dTD
dθ
=
−rVTT
D
> 0 (37)
where D > 0 and VTT < 0 given strict concavity of V (.). Also, VTTD > 0.
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Equations (36) and (37) show that an impact fee discourages both deforesta-
tion and encourage longer rotations. Therefore, whenever it is optimal from a
social perspective to increase both the rotation date and the conversion date,
such an impact fee may implement the optimum. To determine the optimal
impact fee, the social planner needs several pieces of information, including the
amount of forest amenities and timber benefits lost per unit of development
and over time. While timber information might be easy to get, information on
nontimber benefits may be hard to get. In pratice, local governments can rely
on zoning ordinances to regulate land use.
Fig. 1a) shows the marginal cost of waiting as well as the two marginal
benefit curves, private and social. By concavity of v(.), the slope of the private
marginal benefit is negative. The slope of the social marginal benefit curve is
negative, but lower in absolute value because Ft > 0, though not dominating.
So, from a social perspective TD should increase, as well as T. Note that in the
presence of the impact fee, the private marginal benefit of waiting in Fig. 1a,
for each TD, and K, increases with T, that is, moves upwards, by concavity
of v(.), eventually crossing the marginal cost of waiting at the social optimum
development time. Similarly, if Ft < 0, while keeping
dT
dTD
> 0, a one-time lump-
sum subsidy at the development time would give the appropriate incentive to
implement the optimum (see Fig. 2a)).
If, as in Fig 4a), Ft > 0 and dominates, such that
dT
dTD
< 0, in order to de-
velop earlier, the optimal rotation period has to increase in order to increase the
age of the trees at the development time, thus, taking advantage of the benefits
generated by older trees. However, as the private landowners would decrease
optimally the rotation period, the optimal solution from a social perspective
cannot be implemented just with an impact fee. So, no interior solution exists
in this case.
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Yield Tax
Suppose that the land use planner levies a yield or a unit tax on harvesting.
Let δ be the yield tax rate. The first-order conditions of the private forest owner
are now given by:
R(TD, x) = rD + pvt(TD −KT )(1− δ)− r [pv(TD −KT )(1− δ)− c] (38)
pvt((K+1)T−KT )(1−δ) =
r
1− e−rT
[pv((K + 1)T −KT )(1− δ)− c] + (39)
+
rK
1− e−rKT
[
pvt(TD −KT )(1− δ)(1− e−rT )er(K+1)T e−rTD
r
− (pv((K + 1)T −KT )(1− δ)− c)
]
e−rKT
(40)
Differentiating the system of first-order conditions above yields the the im-
pact of the yield tax on the private rotation age T and on the private develop-
ment time, TD as:
dT
dδ
=
VTDTD [G]− VTTD(pvt(TD −KT )− rpv(TD −KT ))
D
(41)
dTD
dδ
=
−VTTD [G] + VTT (pvt(TD −KT )− rpv(TD −KT ))
D
(42)
where
G = (−e−TDK+e−rT
∑
)pvt(TD−KT )−
re−rT
1− e−rT
pv(T )
[
1− e−rKT
1− e−rT
−Ke−rKT
]
< 0
with VTTD > 0, (pvt(TD −KT )− rpv(TD −KT ) > 0, while VTT < 0, VTDTD <
0, and D > 0 by concavity. 13 . Note nevertheless that dT
dδ
anddTD
dδ
must
have the same sign since the private dT
dTD
is always positive (see ??). However,
13D represent the second-order Hessian of V (.), which is positive by strict concavity. See
Appendix.
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the sign of (41) and (42) depends on the sign of its numerator, which cannot
be unambiguosly obtained from the analytical model. As a result, we cannot
determine a priori the impact of an yield tax on the rotation and conversion
dates. In our simulations we examine the alternative cases that can emerge in
the persence of an yield tax.
Zoning Regulation
Zoning regulation is perhaps the most commonly use approach to regulate
land use in the United States. In this paper, we examine the impact of a floor-to-
area ratio (FAR) restriction, that is, strutural density is regulated as a maximum
allowed density. In this case, the zoning restriction will impose the social
optimum for TD, such that the optimal structural density is implemented when
developing at the best use for that time period. Therefore, by imposing that
constraint on the problem, the private landowner will solve for the corresponding
optimal rotation period. Thus, the first-order conditions are similar to those
shown above, in the unregulated case, that is, (31), and (34), evaluated at the
social optimal development time.
Again, we also consider two cases: dT
dTD
> 0, and dT
dTD
< 0.
As dT
dTD
> 0 for the private landowner, if it is optimal to postpone the optimal
development time from a social perspective, then, it has to be also optimal from
a social perspective to increase the optimal rotation period. Hence, if dT
dTD
> 0
from a social perspective, and assuming that Ft > 0, the regulator may inter-
vene by imposing a zoning regulation on the floor-area-ratio, in particular, by
constraining the structural density to be the one associated to the optimal social
conversion time TD. Recall that the optimal social conversion time is greater
than the private one, and that the demanded density is positively sloped, imply-
ing that the best use for that time entails greater structural density. Therefore,
by forcing to postpone development from the private planned time TD to T
∗
D
determines that, when the forested land is developed, it will be for a use with
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greater structural density than it would otherwise have been without inter-
vention (see Fig 1a). At the same time the optimal rotation period will also
increase, increasing the marginal benefit of waiting for each TD, which moves
the marginal private benefit curve upwards. Therefore, this instrument may be
enough to implement the efficient solution from a social perspective. As well,
this intervention will implement the optimal pattern of land development as the
boundary of the developed zone will be the optimal from the social perspective,
that is, x(T ∗D). See Fig. 1a).
If Ft < 0, while keeping
dT
dTD
> 0, a similar case to the previous one is
obtained, except that the marginal benefit curves have their relative positions
reversed. Therefore, a zoning regulation imposing lower structural density than
it would otherwise have been without intervention, will decrease the optimal
rotation period, moving down the private marginal benefit curve. Eventually,
the optimal solution will be implemented. See Fig. 2a).
In contrast, if dT
dTD
< 0, it is not possible to achieve the optimum, at least
within the set of interior solutions. See Figs. 4a), and 4b).
6 Conclusions
This paper has developed a model of a single forest owner operating with perfect
foresight in a dynamic open-city environment that allows for switching between
alternative competing land uses (forest and urban use) at some point in the
future. The model also incorporates external values of an even-aged standing
forest in addition to the value of timber when it is harvested. Timber is exploited
based on a multiple rotation model à la Faustmann with clear-cut harvesting.
In contrast to previous models, our alternative land use to forest land (urban)
is also endogenous.
Within this framework, we have examined the private and socially optimal
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rotation age and time of development of the forest land as well as the interplay
between the conversion date and the rotation date. We found that changes over
time in the opportunity cost of urban land affect development patterns and
leapfrog development may occur at sites where the environmental services pro-
vided by forests are significant and increasing over time or when the marginal
benefits from managing the land for timber and non-timber benefits outweigh
the marginal benefits from converting that plot of land to urban use. Moreover,
as the opportunity cost of the current use of the private land is endogenous, the
private owner responds to changes in incentives by adjusting forest management
practices as well as the development time. The interplay between the rotation
and conversion dates depends nevertheless on the shape of the forest externality
function. If urban trees provide less externalities as they grow older, the ear-
lier the land is converted, the greater the incentive to reduce the rotation date
in order to anticipate revenues from timber and to increase the benefits from
non-timber externalities. In contrast, if externalities grow with the age of the
tree, the impact on the optimal rotation date depends on what effect dominates,
timber or non-timber benefits. To increase benefits from timber exploitation,
trees should be cut earlier, while to increase the production of non-timber ex-
ternalities, it is optimal to postpone harvest. If it is the case where non-timber
externalities are very strong, then the urban area can grow inwards. Finally,
we also show that the slope of the marginal benefit of waiting to develop may
also depend on forest management practices, and not only on the structural
density, in contrast to previous results in the literature, with implications for
policymakers.
In the absence of government intervention, the forest owner considers only
the cash flows from harvesting and selling timber and urban land rents when
managing his forest. As a result, his forest management practices as well as
his time of conversion are not socially optimal, resulting in too much defor-
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estation and urban sprawl. Thus, we also examined in this paper the ability
of anti-sprawl policies (FAR restrictions and impact fees) and harvesting taxes
(yield taxes) to incentivize the private forest owner to increase forest land and
lengthen rotations whenever older trees provide the highest externalities, both
steps which may help mitigate climate change and achieve other significant local
environmental benefits, such as improved water quality, recreational activities,
species habitat and biodiversity.
We show that the optimal pace of land development can be implemented as
a private solution through impact fees that internalize the present value of forest
amenities and irreversibility costs of development. Development fees represent
an additional cost of development and will in general slow the development pace.
Efficiency can also be improved with a density restriction. Density restrictions
affect urban development by reducing the value of land in urban use. These
land use policies also affect rotation date decisions given the interdependency
between conversion and rotation dates.
A key policy insight from our paper is that if we expect the benefits from
urban forests to continue to be highly valued in the future, then government in-
tervention may be required to create appropriate incentives for private landown-
ers to preserve forest land today, even if alternative land use options, such as
urban use, currently offer higher private present value returns. However, policy
makers should take into account the interdependencies between alternative land
uses when setting these incentives. The reason is because these interdependen-
cies create feedback effects, which affect private landowners’ decisions. Another
implication is that urban land use policies can also be used to achieve forest
goals since they may create incentives not to switch to an alternative land use
and by affecting the value of the outside option these policies can also affect
harvest decisions.
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Appendix
Social Planner’s Problem:
The social planner’s problem as stated in (12) can be separated in two prob-
lems, for each K:
1) In the case µ = 0. This implies that TD = KT . Therefore, when trees are
harvested, the amount of timber is given by v(T ), and the problem of the social
planner, as stated in (12), simplifies significantly, as it has only one variable, T,
for each K, and the first and the third terms in (12) are eliminated.
2) In the case 0 < µ < 1, we may write the following Lagrangean maximiza-
tion problem:
Max L(µ, T, λ | K) = V (T,TD | K) + λ[1− µ]
First-order conditions:
∂L
∂T
= ∂V
∂T
≤ 0 T ≥ 0 ∂L
∂T
T = 0
∂L
∂b
= ∂V
∂b
− λ = 0 µ > 0 ∂L
∂µ
µ = 0
∂L
∂λ
= 1− µ > 0 λ ≥ 0 ∂L
∂λ
λ = 0
Since µ < 1, then λ = 0. For an interior solution of µ, this implies that
∂V
∂b
= 0.
Therefore, if there is a solution that satisfies 1) or 2), then it is the solution
of the problem. We can show that the problem is similar to the one that we
solve in the paper, as long as the interior solution exists. As long as there is a
solution for some K, the problem has a solution. If, for different values of K,
one of the two the above problems has a solution, the solution of the problem
will be given by the value of K for which V (.) is maximized.
Total Differential of the the First-order Conditions of Social Planner Prob-
lem (12):
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In order to study the social planner’s optimal harvesting timing-conversion
timing-density choice problem, we differentiate totally the system consisting of
the first-order conditions of the above problem, (14), (13), with respect to T,
and TD, as well as with respect to the parameters of the model, p, and c.
Note that the first-order condition with respect to T,(14) in the body text,
can also be written as follows:
∂V (.)
∂T
= −e−rTDK(pvt(TD−KT )−KF (TD−KT )e
−rTD−rKe−rKT
∫ TD−KT
0
F (t)e−rtdt−
−
re−rT
1− e−rT
(pv(T )− c)
[
1− e−rKT
1− e−rT
−Ke−rKT
]
+
rKe−rKT
1− e−rT
∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt+
−
(1− e−rKT )e−rT
1− e−rT
[
−F (T ) +
r
1− e−rT
∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt
]
+
+e−rT pvt(T )
1− e−rKT
1− e−rT
= 0 (43)
By total differentiating the system of the two first-order conditions, we obtain
a system of two equations.
The first equation is obtained by differentiating totally (13), that is,
{rKpvt(TD −KT )−Kpvtt(TD −KT )−KFt(TD −KT )}dT+
+{−rpvt(TD −KT ) + pvtt(TD −KT ) + Ft(TD −KT )−Rt −Rx
dx
dTD
}dTD+
+{−rv(TD −KT ) + vt(TD −KT )}dp+ rdc = 0 (44)
The second equation of the corresponding system of equations is obtained
by differentiating totally (14), and is given as follows
{e−rTpvtt(T )
1− e−rKT
1− e−rT
+ e−rTpvt(T ) [B]−
re−rT
1− e−rT
pvt(T ) [C]
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+
r2e−rT
(1− e−rT )
2 (pv(T )− c) [A] +
+e−rTDK2pvtt(TD−KT )+[E]}dT−{K(−rpvt(TD−KT )+pvtt(TD−KT )+Ft(TD−KT ))}dTD+
+{e−rTvt(T )
1− e−rKT
1− e−rT
−
re−rT
1− e−rT
v(T ) [C]−
−e−rTDKvt(TD −KT )}dp+ {
re−rT
1− e−rT
[C]}dc = 0 (45)
where A =
∑
−Ke−rKT−K2e−rKT (1−e−rT )− (K+1)e
−rKT
−e−rKTKe−rT−e−rT
1−e−rT
= −K
2e−rT (K+3)+3K2e−rT (K+2)+e−2rT−2e−rT (1+K)−3K2e−rT(1+K)+Ke−rT (K+2)−e−rT+e−rKT−Ke−rT (1+K)+K2e−rKT
−e−2rT+2e−rT−1
B = −
∑
r + ∂
∑
∂T
= − (1−e
−rKT )r
1−e−rT +
rKe−rKT (1−e−rT )−re−rT (1−e−rKT )
(1−e−rT )2
=
−r 1−e
−rKT
−Ke−rKT+Ke−rT (K+1)
(−1+e−rT )2
C =
∑
−Ke−rKT = (1−e
−rKT )
1−e−rT
−Ke−rKT = −1+e
−rKT+Ke−rKT−Ke−rT (1+K)
−1+e−rT
and E = e−rTDK2vtt(TD −KT ) +K
2Ft(TD −KT )e
−rTD+
+r2K2e−rKT
∫ TD−KT
0 F (t)e
−rtdt+ rK2F (TD −KT )e−rTD+
+−r
2K2e−rKT (1−e−rT )−r2e−rTKe−rKT
(1−e−rT )2
∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt+ rKe
−−rKT
1−e−rT F (T )e
−rT+
+e−rT
[
F (T )− r
1−e−rT
∫ T
0
F (t)e−rtdt
]
[∂
∑
∂T
−
∑
r]+
+
∑
e−rT [Ft(T ) +
r2e−rT
(1−e−rT )2
∫ T
0 F (t)e
−rtdt− r1−e−rT F (T )e
−rT ].
where
∑
= 1−e
−rKT
1−e−rT .
We may also write the above system as follows:
VTDTdT + VTDTDdTD + VTDpdp+ VTDcdc = 0
VTTdT + VTTDdTD + VTpdp+ VTcdc = 0
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By strict concavity of V (.) we have that VTT < 0, VTDTD < 0, and D =
VTDTDVTT − (VTTD)
2 > 0.
Assuming that the price of timber, p, the cost of replanting, c, and the dis-
count rate, r, are fixed, we first study the impact of a change in the optimal
development time on the boundary of the developed zone, x. Hence, after divid-
ing the system by dTD, from (45) we obtain
dT
dTD
, that is, the optimal adjustment
of harvesting time with respect to a marginal change in the optimal conversion
time. Inserting this result in (44), we are finally able to derive the impact of a
marginal change in the optimal timing of conversion on the boundary.
We now show these results. From (45) we have:
dT
dTD
=
−VTTD
VTT
=
−rKpvt(TD −KT ) +Kpvtt(TD −KT ) +KFt(TD −KT )
VTT
(46a)
This condition is the same as (26) in the body text.
We could obtain similar conditions for the unregulated problem, by ignoring
non-timber benefits.
To study the effect of the impact fee and the yield tax we proceed similarly,
that is, by differentiating the above system with respect to the corresponding
policy instruments.
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